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... man, proud man,
Drest in a little brief authority,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
His glassy essence, like an angry ape,
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven,
As make the angels weep ...
Measure for Measure
i.33
I.
During the past four hundred years many institutions that Ameri-
cans consider to be the natural order of human affairs were born: rep-
resentative democracy, the private enterprise system of capitalism, and
individualism, among others. Were one to ask why they appeared at
roughly the same time in a quite limited geographical area, what would
be the answer? Even if we accept, as we must, the view that there can
be no simple and complete explanation of any human phenomenon,1 let
alone a set of them, history possibly provides a principal determinant.
The basic premise of this essay in American constitutionalism is that
those "natural" institutions and, indeed, the very concept of constitu-
tionalism itself as it has been received and understood by modern con-
stitutional scholars were in large part consequences of the Great Dis-
coveries that began with Columbus. Wealth in theretofore untold
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Center for the Study of Law; Professor Emeritus of Law, National Law Center,
George Washington University. This essay is based on the author's work in progress, a
book tentatively entitled GETrING THERE FROM HERE: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FOR
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the Rockefeller Foundation for its kind hospitality at the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio,
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1. E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIEN-
TIFIc EXPLANATION (1961).
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amounts poured into the "metropolis"-Western Europe-and seem-
ingly endless land became available to the hard-pressed peoples of Eu-
rope. They were thus able to escape the ecological trap, with its con-
comitant authoritarian institutions, that had imprisoned them in a rigid
caste system throughout known human history.
With the Great Discoveries, a static society gave way-slowly and
haltingly at first-to one of permanent revolution. The ancient and me-
dieval worlds were closed. Space, rather than being infinite, was consid-
ered to be a solid sphere in which the stars were embedded. Time, too,
was finite: to medieval man the world was four thousand years old and
would end in a short time. Learning was limited: people believed that
the final truth on all subjects had already been written, if not in the
Bible then by Aristotle and Plato and Euclid and other ancients. The
Bible as Holy Writ was the ultimate truth for religion and cosmology.
Those who thought and wrote did so-with rare exceptions (such as
Copernicus)-within a closed body of knowledge; they were confined to
refining the accepted wisdom of the day. The universe was anthropo-
centric: earth was its center and man was the special creature of an all-
knowing and all-wise God. It was an authoritarian, even totalitarian,
age-in economics and politics and religion.
Then came the Discoveries (and the Copernican Revolution) and
following them massive alterations in social institutions. Societal
change started slowly, but accelerated; by the nineteenth century it be-
came characteristic of the social order. Today, it is built into human
affairs. We live at a time when revolution has been made a perpetual
institution-not in the sense of a violent overthrow of government but,
rather, as an apparently permanent feature of socio-economic, and thus
of political, institutions. The underlying assumptions, the metaphysic,
of society have been altered. Human life on earth-I speak here of the
Western world-rather than being thought of as a prelude to heaven or
hell, became an end in itself. It became possible (at least for a time)
"to think of. . .the conquest of the material world in human interest,
of providing the conditions for a good life on this planet without refer-
ence to any possible hereafter." 2 The idea of progress flowered. Rather
than living in the final age, humankind saw itself as participating in a
process of progressive improvement of the human lot. People became
optimistic, rather than having a "sombre melancholy." No problem was
considered to be insoluble, it being the humanistic vision that people
2. Beard, Introduction to J. BURY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS: AN INQUIRY INTO
ITs ORIGIN AND GROWTH xi (1955).
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through applied reason could not only know, but could solve, all
problems. Faith in an all-wise God was subtly transferred to faith in
scientists and technologists, who were considered to be able to create
technological "fixes" that would ameliorate the harshness of life. Polit-
ics changed: the nation-state replaced feudalism as the characteristic
form of political order. Economics developed from mercantilism-a
Statist economy-to laissez-faire private enterprise capitalism, al-
though the State was still important as a protector of and stimulant to
business. The individual human being was perceived as the basic unit
of society, a belief that crept into and dominated law and legal institu-
tions. In short, the "modern age" was born.
My point is not necessarily that a direct causal connection existed
between all of those developments and the Great Discoveries, but,
rather, that only after the Discoveries did the new ihstitutions and be-
liefs come into existence. An environment was provided in which new
ideas and concepts could flourish. Those who may think that this is an
example of post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacious reasoning should con-
sider what Adam Smith wrote in 1776:3
The general advantages which Europe, considered as a great
country, has derived from the discovery and colonization of
America, consist, first, in the increase of its enjoyments; and sec-
ondly, in the augmentation of its industry.
The surplus product of America, imported into Europe, fur-
nishes the inhabitants of the great continent with a variety of com-
modities which they could not otherwise have possessed ...
The discovery and colonization of America . . . have contrib-
uted to augment the industries, first, of all the countries which
trade to it directly . . . and, secondly, of all those which, without
trading to it directly, send, through the medium of other countries,
goods to it of their own produce.
Without the wealth of the Great Discoveries, modern capitalism could
not have flourished. So, too, with its political counterpart: liberal de-
mocracy. What would have been abnormal before the Discoveries be-
came normal.
No present need exists to buttress what has been said about the
new age, for Walter Prescott Webb in one of the most important, albeit
little noticed, books of this century, The Great Frontier, has provided
3. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 92 (1776).
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ample data to show that the modern age is "an abnormal age, and not
a progressive orderly development which mankind was destined to
make anyway."' 4 Building on Turner's "frontier theory" of American
history,5 Webb saw the Great Frontier as "one of the primary factors
of modern history. . . .The sudden acquisition of land and other forms
of wealth by the people of Europe precipitated a boom on Western civi-
lization. . . .That boom lasted as long as the frontier was open, a pe-
riod of four centuries." A four hundred-year boom took place, a boom
that was unique in time and space. I would vary that, for the United
States at least, to maintain that the boom lasted until about 1970. The
world frontier closed during the first part of this century. The bulk of
public lands had disappeared. An enormous increase in population has
made the density per square mile, both in Europe and in the new world,
on average greater than the density was in Europe in 1500. Turner had
limited his scope to the American frontier only, but Webb took that
analysis to its logical end.
Turner's perspective was too narrow; he concentrated on the avail-
ability of land and solely on the American experience. Webb went fur-
ther: he saw that resources were as important as land and he envisaged
a frontier far larger than Turner's. David M. Potter, in his study of the
American character, criticizes Webb for not recognizing that "advanc-
ing technology" 6 went hand in hand with the bounty of nature to create
what Potter saw as the distinctive American character.
There can be little question that technology had much to do with
the exploitation of the resources of the Great Frontier. Potter correctly
chides Webb for according too much attention to what Potter calls "ge-
ographical determinism."' That raises the question of whether the
means by which humans can order their affairs in a humane way for
everyone-by which, that is, they can create a sustainable society-are
presently available. Is technology the answer? Rather, can it provide an
answer to the problems confronting people everywhere? Can technology
be harnessed in ways adequate to effect a transition to such a society?
The question asks much. We do not know its answer. But what seems
unassailable is this: to harness technology in the quest for a sustainable
society will require a continuing cooperative effort, one that can in final
4. W. WEBB, THE GREAT FRONTIER 14 (1952).
5. F. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1920).
6. D. POTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY: ECONOMIC ABUNDANCE AND THE AMERICAN
CHARACTER 161 (1954).
7. Id. at 163.
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analysis only be undertaken by government. Thus, the crucial constitu-
tional question is posed: What changes in present-day politico-economic
institutions are in order?
Even though his analysis is incomplete, Webb's conclusions seem
to be irrefutable. Some questions that they present include: (a) do po-
litical and economic institutions that matured during the four hundred-
year boom, and were adapted to those conditions, require alteration
now that the frontier has closed? and (b) is there somewhere, somehow,
a modern substitute for that boom? The answers, only adumbrated
here, may be simply stated: (a) yes, those institutions--economic and
political and philosophical-must be thoroughly examined anew to de-
termine how they should be changed to fit a radically new, indeed
unique, environment; and (b) no new frontier of comparable signifi-
cance is in the offing. Outer space, whether within or without the solar
system, cannot under any reasonably foreseeable set of circumstances
be a substitute for the Great Discoveries. On the contrary, rather than
providing new resources and new lands, space exploration and settle-
ment (even though theoretically possible) would enormously drain ex-
isting resources. True it is that science and technology-first in the In-
dustrial Revolution and now in the Microprocessing Revolution-have
enabled some of humankind to stave off the imperatives of the end of
the four hundred-year boom, mainly because of vastly improved pro-
ductivity of labor, plus the invention of the art of invention. Some ob-
servers, accordingly, look upon science as an endless frontier. To the
extent that science and technology can be employed to help develop a
new environment, that belief is valid. The rub comes, however, because
science, too, is resource-draining. It cannot create matter; that is a
physical impossibility. And we have learned in recent years that en-
tropy is a universal law that cannot be repealed. The transition to an
"information society" at most means that information can be trans-
ferred without loss, without being in a zero-sum game. But information
is not an end in itself; ultimately, it must deal with resources. The una-
voidable "bottom line" is the humankind-resources ratio. Technology
can be used to provide means to transfer information and employ re-
sources so as to adapt the species to a new type of living-if only it will
be used. Whether it will be is as yet unanswered.
In sum, then, what has seemed to be normal during most of Amef-
ican history--economic growth, relative peace, immense natural re-
sources, the idea of progress and of the perfectability of man-has in
dour fact actually been abnormal-abnormal as compared with how
Homo sapiens lived prior to the Great Discoveries and how it has lived
1983]
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outside of Europe and a few European colonies since the Discoveries.
The Golden Age of the Western world commenced about 1600 and
lasted until about 1970, at which time time-honored institutions began
to become unraveled. Society, ever increasingly and the world over,
cannot be called "sustainable." A "sustainable society" is one in which
human needs and deserts are fulfilled within the constraints of the envi-
ronment. Immense strains created by burgeoning population and rapid
depletion of resources have retrogressed the man-land ratio to a situa-
tion worse than it was in 1650. In the West, population density in 1500
was about 26.7 per square mile; by 1940, that figure had become 34.8
per square mile--and it is far worse today. Only, as has been sug-
gested, the advent of technology enabled humans to have a relatively
abundant economy-and then often at the expense of the poverty-rows
of the Third World. I have already suggested that I do not think that
such technological "progress" can long continue, but it need not.
Enough is now known to keep the ecological trap from closing.
Whether that trap will snap shut or whether it will remain open is one
of the great unanswered questions of the day.
This essay suggests the need for institutional change across the
board, based on the idea that such alterations, when and if made, could
help effect a transition to a sustainable society, a society that is not so
much static as in relative equilibrium, a society that has human dignity
for all as its summum bonum. A preliminary question involves the ex-
tent to which law, however and by whomever promulgated and in
whatever form, can be useful in that transition. It is conceded that lim-
its to effective legal action do exist; and that law, by itself, is a frail
reed upon which to rely. We have had laws and legal institutions for
millenia, and constitutionalism in the normative sense of limitations on
government is central to the American ethos, but candor compels the
admission that they have been relatively impotent-thus far, at
least-in achieving a decent society for all. Law, of course, is not irrel-
evant, but it must take its place with other techniques and mecha-
nisms-those subsumed under the broad rubric of politics-if it is to
play an effective role in the time of troubles that lie dead ahead.
II.
As the United States counts down to the 200th anniversary of its
only constitutional convention, it is becoming increasingly clear that
8. Webb, supra note 4, at 8 n.18.
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major changes are necessary in the oldest written fundamental law. So-
cial institutions-political, economic, legal-are under severe chal-
lenge, so much so that it is by no means certain that a smooth transi-
tion to a sustainable society can be made. The challenge, in sum, is
even greater than the sanguinary strife of the Civil War, the only previ-
ous episode in American history at all comparable to today's time of
troubles. This essay is an argument for basic constitutional alteration,
not only in the Document of 1787 itself but also in the congeries of
customs and practices that have grown up extra-constitutionally. Both
the formal and the living (or operative) constitutions require thorough
study and revamping. My theme comes from a recent statement by
Willy Brandt: ". . . the two decades ahead of us may be fateful for
mankind. . . . Many global issues will come to a head during the
period." 9
"We know we are on an unsustainable path," Dr. Lester Brown
maintains. "We also know that there are no simple technological
fixes." 10 That is not really correct: Some, but far from all, know, and
indeed many dispute, Brown's conclusion. Among opinion leaders, who
should if they thought about it agree with Brown (and Brandt), a per-
vasive attitude of Micawberism may be detected-the sublime belief,
labeled after the character in Dicken's David Copperfield, that some-
thing will always turn up to solve human problems and even to rescue
humankind from its follies. That confidence, that faith, is, as has been
suggested, the consequence of two factors-the Great Discoveries of
the past four hundred years, a part of which were the seemingly inex-
haustible resources of the United States; and a blind, unthinking belief
that scientists and technologists can willy-nilly create technological so-
lutions for specific problems. The age of discoveries has run its course,
and the species, which exists in massive numbers today (and many
more in the future-from the present 4.6 billion world population to
about 6.5 billion in the year 2000), is now entering an ecological trap
similar to that which existed in pre-Columbian times. Unregulated
technology, furthermore, can be both boon and bane, in the sense that
"second-order" consequences of new developments can have harmful
side effects. Only if technology is approached systemically or holisti-
cally can there be hope that it will be an overall boon. And that, as has
been suggested, can only come from government-which points up the
9. W. BRANDT, NORTH-SouTH, A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL: REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IsSUES 7 (1980).
10. L. BROWN, BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 8 (1981).
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constitutional challenge.
Can familiar societal institutions-capitalism, representative gov-
ernment, constitutionalism-that were developed in the four hundred-
year boom perform adequately in the emergent age? Can they harness
technology? The answer suggested here is a flat negative: They cannot.
And that, I suggest, is so even though they have undergone and con-
tinue to undergo considerable alteration since first they appeared-as
has been said, quite recently as time is reckoned, and in a limited geo-
graphical area. Each was and is a reflection of the environment in
which it has existed. Those institutions were not a priori; rather, they
were a posteriori. They grew, not by design but by reaction to circum-
stances. As such, they do not represent eternal truths about the human
condition. Quite the contrary: they represent, to update Thucydides's
famous comment, human situations where the strong continue to do
what they can and the weak still suffer what they must.
That, it seems to me, is the way that matters have always been.
To be realistic, perhaps it is the way they will always be. The argu-
ment in this essay suggests that it is not an either-or proposition.
Knowledge is available by which a sustainable society can be built. I do
not say that it will be realized, the capacity of humans to order their
affairs with minimal decency for all is by no means certain." Creating
that society will not only require foresight and planning to a degree not
before known, it will also require the strong to perceive what they have
seldom done in the past-that they and the weak are in the same boat
and will sink or float together. The ultimate aim is for a dynamic
euqilibrium between population and resources-worldwide.
Lester Brown asserts quite correctly: "Creating a sustainable soci-
ety will require fundamental economic and social changes, a wholesale
alternation of economic priorities and population policies." Well and
good, but only so far as it goes: Brown does not say how to get there
from here. He does not tackle the immensely difficult problem of insti-
tutional change; nor does he face up to the indispensable requirement
that any discussion of political theory-what he is talking about-must
be based upon an accurate cognizance of the nature of human nature.
In final analysis, Brown is speaking about constitutional matters; the
changes he calls for are those that concern what constitutions are all
about: the governing institutions of society, who benefits from govern-
mental decisions, the relationships with other governments.
11. See D. EHRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM (1978).
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I have suggested that a sustainable society is one in which humans
everywhere have their basic needs and deserts fulfilled insofar as the
environment permits. That brief definition, of course, raises more ques-
tions than it answers. Such a society, at the very least, will require that
an equilibrating balance be struck between Homo sapiens and the
planet it occupies and dominates (I do not say subdued, because evi-
dence is growing that nature is rebelling). Humankind must, contrary
to the Judeo-Christian tradition and ethic, perceive that it is an inte-
gral part of nature, at one with it and not superior to it. To be con-
temptuous of nature is to invite disaster. The great and enduring task
of modern constitutionalism is to help create such an equilibrium. Since
1787, American constitutionalism has been largely concerned with
principles of balance-but only within the political order: in the separa-
tion of powers in the national government, in the federal system, in the
relationship of persons to government. That limited conception is no
longer sufficient to the growing need; the notion of balance, of equilib-
rium, must now be taken to the entire social order, and, indeed, to the
entire planet. The balance is between Homo sapiens and nature. That
poses the need for a fundamental reordering of the very concept of
constitutionalism.
In politics, however, balance must give way to a concept of pro-
cess, to recognition that the political, the constitutional, order follows
Darwinian and Einsteinian rather than Newtonian principles. Within
principles of the balance between humankind and the rest of nature,
process rules. Isaac Newton likened the universe to a great clock, with
interacting parts, and with the laws of cause-and-effect playing a pri-
mary role. Darwin and Einstein changed that permanently. The politi-
cal order is a process; it follows the laws of evolution, not "the mechan-
istic world view of Cartesian-Newtonian science," which is
"outdated.''2 And the Constitution has always been relative to circum-
stances. It is, therefore, both Darwinian and Einsteinian. As Carolyn
Merchant, historian of science at the University of California, Berke-
ley, has put it:
In investigating the roots of our current environmental dilemma
and its connections to science, technology and the economy, we
must re-examine the formation of a world-view and a science
which, by reconceptualizing reality as a machine rather than a liv-
12. See F. CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT: SCIENCE, SOCIETY AND THE RISING
CULTURE 15 (1982).
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ing organism, sanctioned the domination of both nature and
women. The contributions of such founding "fathers" of modern
science as Francis Bacon, William Harvey, Rene Descartes,
Thomas Hobbes and Issac Newton must be re-evaluated. 13
That is a relatively new insight, one that is far from totally recog-
nized and accepted by those who study the Constitution. Indeed, it is
fair to say that many constitutional scholars reject constitutional Dar-
winism and that most of them have not thought of constitutional Ein-
steinism. Throughout American history the Constitution has been
viewed mainly through the eyes of lawyers as a legal document, to be
treated as any other legal instrument. That simply is not adequate to
the need.
American constitutionalism has been concerned mainly with the
powers of government to organize itself and its relationships to the indi-
viduals and groups of society-with, that is, a combination of limita-
tions on official power and a tacit expression of the affirmative powers
of government. As lawyers and political scientists know it, constitu-
tional law tended to be interdictory, principally exegeses on a theme of
what government could not do. Until quite recent times, little was rec-
ognized about the affirmative powers of the State. (That lack of theory
of the positive aspect of government was changed in the 1930s and
1940s.) Constitutional theory since the beginnings considered the natu-
ral person to be free-standing, autonomous, answerable chiefly to him-
self and to his God. Insofar as possible the person was to be loosed
from constraints from the State, which was to assist rather than regu-
late. Formal constitutional law, the law of the books, was viewed as one
of limitations or of rights. The law in action, the operative constitu-
tional law, differed. It was one of powers.
Formal constitutional law took a significant turn about a half-cen-
tury ago. It merged with the operative Constitution so as to add a layer
of governmental permissiveness to the palimpsest that is the Document
of 1787. At the same time, some of the limitations on government
finally got judicial recognition. Not always, to be sure, but often. (The
relationship between judicial cognizance of civil rights and civil liber-
ties to constitutional Keynesianism has never been explored.) The new
latitude permitted government was not the same on specifics as it was
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Quite the contrary. For
13. C. MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND THE SCIEN-
TIFIC REVOLUTION xviii (1980).
[Vol. 8
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss1/1
1 Four Hundred-Year Boom
150 years the operative Constitution permitted massive governmental
aid to business, to the exploitation of the resources of well-nigh virgin
continent, to suppressing internal discontent (large and small), to the
expansion of the American empire. Since the 1930s government has
become "positive" in nature, in the sense that it has undertaken, with
Supreme Court approval, affirmative obligations to the entire popu-
lace.1 4 Those duties are expressed in congressional statutes, which when
enacted were given the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. Thus on a
general level government assumed a new posture. Formal law was still
apparently limitative-I say "apparently" because the Constitution has
always been relative to circumstances-but in fact a Constitution of
powers in a secular state came into existence. The Supreme Court, as
the nation's authoritative faculty of political theory, redefined the na-
ture of freedom from autonomous man individualistically standing
alone to liberty in a social organization. Formal law, that is, acknowl-
edged the group basis of politics and of economics; and the operative
law made the individual person important only as a member of a group
or groups. More recently, yet another layer is being added to the an-
cient parchment, one that expressly validates increasing controls upon
individual behavior. Those controls emanate from both public and pri-
vate governments-from, that is, the organs of the Political and of the
Economic Constitutions. 5
A contemporaneous development involves the judiciary. At times,
but far from always, judges issue commands to other governmental of-
ficers, telling them what they must do (as compared with historically
telling them what they could not do). In some respects, the question in
some constitutional cases has become: If the natural person owes duties
and obligations to the groups of the political and economic orders
(which he does, principally to the nation-state), to what extent does the
group owe correlative duties and obligations to the person? This small
shift in judicial constitution-making should be openly recognized, as-
similated into constitutional theory, and extended into a fundamental
law of basic human needs and deserts. Not that the judges can do the
job alone. They cannot. Such an argument, of course, entails advocacy
of an exponential jump in the theory and practice of American consti-
tutionalism. Hence the requirement, both for cooperative actions
14. See A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1968).
15. See A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982); Miller, Toward A Definition of "The" Consti-
tution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 633 (1983).
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among all three branches of government (as well as cooperation be-
tween the nation and the states and, of even greater significance, the
nation and the governments elsewhere on the planet) and for a consti-
tutional convention.
Law historically was based upon an assumption about the nature
of man and the environment. Briefly, that assumption was the political
version of Adam Smith economics-the belief that there is a "market-
place" of politics in which the individual actions of persons and the
groups they form result, as by "an invisible hand," in the overall com-
mon good. Nature (the environment) was perceived through John
Locke's eyes as beneficent, not as the harsh and forbidding world of
Thomas Hobbes. It has now become all too clear that humans every-
where, including Americans, are now in a Hobbesian world, in a slowly
closing ecological trap thoroughly familiar to those who lived in medie-
val Europe but only little known in the United States. This is the "cli-
macteric" of humankind. We live, not in a period of crisis, but at a
time when a number of crises are coalescing.16
The formal Constitution, the Constitution of the books, is obsoles-
cent, even obsolete, in substantial part, and therefore in need of sub-
stantial revision. The operative fundamental law is becoming corpora-
tist in a fact, through a process of unannounced but portentous
constitutional alteration. Tensions produced by new environmental con-
straints make it clear that the process of progressive updating of the
Constitution by the Supreme Court and other authoritative decision-
makers is no longer sufficient to the need. The resulting problem is sys-
temic, not aberrational, and cannot be cured by a constitutional Band-
Aid or quick fix. From that it follows that radical constitutional change
is required. Alterations, some quite drastic, in the formal and operative
constitutions are necessary, predicated on the bedrock proposition that
humankind must attain a "oneness" with nature.
Enormous difficulties must be surmounted to get "there" from
"here" by means of institutional change, "there" being a sustainable
society and "here" being the climacteric. There are limits to effective
legal action. Moreoever, since "[p]olitical theory which does not start
from a theory of man . . . is quite worthless, 17 the question of human
nature must be faced. No alteration in the nature of the species is sug-
16. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITU-
TION OF CONTROL (1981); F. CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT: SCIENCE, SOCIETY AND
THE RISING CULTURE (1982).
17. P. RHINELANDER, IS MAN COMPREHENSIBLE TO MAN? 1 (1973).
[Vol. 8
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss1/1
Four Hundred-Year Boom
gested; rather, I maintain that the irreducible necessity is for those in
positions of power and influence to recognize where their long-term in-
terests lie (it being assumed that they readily perceive their short-term
interests). Finally, it is recommended that a constitutional convention
be convened to consider radical change in the fundamental law.
III.
That much of what is said in this essay is controversial goes with-
out saying. When speaking of constitutions, and particularly of the
American Constitution, one deals with political theory and social eth-
ics, and perhaps of greatest importance, with an aspect of religion-a
civil or secular religion. The Document of 1787 is the basic instrument
of America's civil religion, which in its totality is far more important
than orthodox theological institutions and dogmas. Americans revere
an ancient piece of parchment as much or more than the Bible of the
Talmud. To argue that the Constitution requires rewriting cuts as close
to the nerve as asking that the Bible be redrafted. The time, however,
is long past for Americans to confront the demonstrable fact that
Woodrow Wilson was correct when he said in 1885 that "[tihe Consti-
tution in operation is-manifestly a very different thing from the Consti-
tution of the books";1 8 and therefore that today's fundamental law is
only metaphorically connected to the Document of 1787. A harsh real-
ity must be faced: that the ancient Document solidifies societal institu-
tions, both public and private, that are positive barriers to fair, decent
and efficient government. I do not suggest that a new Bible be written,
although surely a persuasive case can be made for rethinking human-
kind's relationship to the cosmos-which is what the Bible is all about.
A constitution-any constitution, written or unwritten-is concerned
with how humans relate to each other, how their affairs are ordered,
and how they organize themselves into collectivities. At times, those
collectivities are called government, public government, but quite often
they are at least nominally private. The mundane, yet immensely im-
portant, level of juristic theories of politics is the concern of this essay.
Several assumptions underlie what is said here, including the
following:
1. A distinction must be made between society (the aggregate of
essentially atomistic individuals and groups in the nation), the State (a
18. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLIT-
ics 30 (1885).
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metaphysical concept in the name of which society is governed; al-
though it cannot be seen or touched, it is as real as any natural per-
son-and perhaps more so), and government (the visible apparatus of
the State). This differentiation is seldom made in the literature of con-
stitutional law; judges and commentators alike being content to use the
terms as if they are synonymous. They are not.
2. So far as political economy is concerned, however, the atomistic
individual does not exist as such. A person gathers constitutional signif-
icance only in his relationship with others; he is important both politi-
cally and economically only when he combines his personal strength
with members of a group. Politics, in other words, considers the group
to be the basic social unit. In economics, this is the age of collective
action.
3. Government is both public and private. Public governance con-
sists of those visible organs, legislative and executive and judicial, that
are usually solely considered to be government. The other dimension of
private governance consists of the major pluralistic groups in the na-
tion, of which the giant corporations are the principal exemplar. In
other words, Americans are governed by both a political and an eco-
nomic Constitution, which combine in an emergent corporatist
Constitution.
4. The State (sometimes called the public or the national interest)
is more than the arithmetical sum of the private interests of the nation.
It has its own claims, as President John F. Kennedy acknowledged in a
burst of candor in 1962. Answering a question about a "public inter-
est" in collective bargaining negotiations, he said: "These companies
are free and the unions are free. All we [the Executive] can try to do is
to indicate . . . the public interest which is there. After all, the public
interest is the sum of the private interests, or perhaps it's even some-
times a little more. In fact, it is a little more." '19 That was iterated by
President Jimmy Carter in his farewell address: "the national interest
is not always the sum of all our single or special interests." 20 From time
to time the Supreme Court has echoed that sentiment, as, for example,
in Justice John M. Harlan's 1959 opinion for the Court in Barenblatt
v. United States.21 "In the last analysis," said Harlan, Congress's
power to investigate possible subversions rests "on the right of self-
19. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1962, at 14, col. 5.
20. Miami Herald, Jan. 15, 1981 § A at 16, col. 1
21. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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preservation, 'the ultimate value of any society'. 22 Wittingly or not
(probably not), Kennedy, Carter and Harlan adopted, at least implic-
itly, an important Machiavellian principle: "It is not the well-being of
individuals that makes cities great . .. The common good can be re-
alized in spite of those who suffer in consequence. '23
5. The United States, the theory to the contrary notwithstanding,
has always followed Machiavellian principles. That is particularly seen
in the operative Constitution, but at times may also be seen in the for-
mal Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Machiavelli,
moreover, was one of the most wrongfully maligned political theorists
in history. Far from the murderous Machiavel that so many have
painted him, a careful reading of his best work, The Discourses, and
even of his best-known book, The Prince, reveals that he preferred a
republic over a prince-if it could be obtained. To assert that the
United States has followed Machiavellian principles is simply to say
that throughout its history it has been far more tough-minded than the
myth system would have it.
6. There is what Professor David Ehrenfeld has labeled "the arro-
gance of humanism" 24 -the idea, widely held, that humans have the
capacity to order their affairs with a measure of decency for all; that,
in other words, man can plan and thus control the future. Although it
is doubtless true that the technological future can and will be invented
(with wholly unpredictable consequences), that by no means is proof
that Homo sapiens can guide the course of social events in a reasonable
adequate manner. "Every inventor," Daniel Boorstin maintains, "is a
Pandora"; 25 the first-order consequences, those which are obvious, may
be easily forecast, but the problem lies in the second-order conse-
quences. Scientists and technologists, Alvin Weinberg has said, have
made a "Faustian bargain" with society. That is dangerous (how much
we know not) because it involves "the mounting complexity of technol-
ogy along with the staggering problems of managing the response to
ecological scarcity. . . . These will require us to depend on a special
class of experts in charge of our survival and well-being-a 'priesthood
of responsible technologists'."2
22. Id. at 117-18 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951)).
23. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 1.6 (1974).
24. Ehrenfeld, supra note 11.
25. D. BOORSTIN, THE REPUBLIC OF TECHNOLOGY: REFLECTIONS ON OUR Fu-
TURE 91 (1978).
26. Weinberg, Technology and Ecology-Is There A Need for Confrontation?
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7. If Weinberg is accurate, that implies the emergence of an overt
class, even caste, society. The beginnings of such a stratified society are
already evident.
8. Ehrenfeld may be correct; but even so, the effort to create a
sustainable society should be made. As with most of man's efforts to
determine his destiny, the quest may in final analysis be futile, even
absurd. We must, however, learn to live with absurdity--"or what's a
heaven for?"
9. Government will remain an active-indeed, a neces-
sary-participant in societal affairs. It will not fade away, despite the
wishes of such deep-thinkers as Milton Friedman. Even if the views of
Friedman and his followers were to prevail, that would merely mean
that the American people would trade visible public governance for the
equally and perhaps greater onerous constraints and restraints of invisi-
ble private governments.
10. Law, including constitutional law, will become more and more
outwardly instrumental, rather than interdictory. It will be overtly tele-
ological-purposive, goal-seeking.
11. The American Constitution, a politico-legal palimpsest, is al-
ways in a state of "becoming," updated by several means to meet the
exigencies faced by succeeding generations of Americans. This means
that government is and has always been precisely as strong as condi-
tions required. The State has a "reserve power" that enables it, operat-
ing through government, to meet every challenge that historically con-
fronted it.
12. That the State will do so in the future seems sure. The ques-
tion is how, not if it will do so. As I have argued in Democratic Dicta-
torship,27 authoritarian government seems likely. Can constitutional
change stave that off? In some respects, the basic problem that consti-
tutionalism faces is how to avoid Arnold Toynbee's doleful forecast: "In
all developed countries, a new way of life-a severely regimented
way-will have to be imposed by a ruthless authoritarian govern-
ment."' 28 That is an even greater constitutional challenge than the Civil
War. There is no neat formula by which the shoals to a humane
steady-state society can be navigated.
13. Simply because of its enormous economic and military power,
the United States will continue to be a major force in world affairs.
23 BIOSCIENCE 41, 43 (1973).
27. Miller, supra note 16 passim.
28. Id. at 151.
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Anything that happens anywhere on the planet, and indeed in outer
space, is of interest and importance to the American political order.
14. There is no such thing as totally unbiased knowledge. "Every
major human activity, including the search for pure and disinterested
knowledge, is norm-governed and value-oriented." 20 The need, there-
fore, is to heed Gunnar Myrdal's advice: social commentators should
"face their valuations," setting them out for all to see.30 Only then can
there be a semblance of objectivity.
15. Burly sinners rule the world, often, to be sure, in well-pressed
clothes and outwardly pleasant demeanor, but sinners nonetheless.
People of thought are not nearly as important as they think or so
Keynes, in a famous passage, asserted "the ideas of economists and
political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are
wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the
world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be
quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually slaves of
some defunct economist."311 The word, not the gun, may be the symbol
of authority; but word mechanics, the people of thought, are in large
part thrall to those who exercise real power in society.
16. One way to control the populace is to use religion, not only as
an opiate, as Marx in a famous passage said, but in its "civil" sense.
He spoke about organized religion. The civil or secular religion of na-
tionalism or patriotism or Americanism is one of the means by which
people en masse are organized and controlled.
IV.
The two hundred-year odyssey of the American people has come
to a crossroads. Is it the end of the beginning? Or is it the beginning of
the end? Which direction will the United States take? Which should it
take? Of one thing we can be sure: the future that looms dead ahead
will not be a mere unilinear extension of the past. "The past is but
prologue." But prologue to what? The American past, as we have seen,
has been based on a unique set of environmental circumstances.
Machiavelli viewed history as neither determined progression nor an
ineluctable cycle of recurring forms. To him, history was constant
29. Rhinelander, supra note 17, at 93.
30. G. MYRDAL, VALUE IN SOCIAL THEORY (1958).
31. J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY
383 (1936).
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change, to which forms of government must adapt, and uncertainty to
which any type of government must be adaptable. In his words:
Since ...all human affairs are ever in a state of flux, and
cannot stand still, either there will be improvement or decline, and
necessity will lead you to do many things which reason does not
recommend. Hence if a commonwealth be constituted with a view
to its maintaining the status quo, but not with a view to expansion,
and by necessity it be led to expand, its basic principles will be
subverted and it will soon be faced with ruin. So, too, should
heaven, on the other hand, be so kind to it that it has no need to go
to war, it will then come about that idleness will either render it
effeminate or give rise to factions; and these two things, either in
conjunction or separately, will bring about its downfall. 2
We may morally object to Machiavelli's implied view that war and
territorial expansion are to be sought for the good of the common-
wealth; but if we change the notion of war to one of economic expan-
sion-to continued economic growth-would those same moral objec-
tions be proffered? All governments today, whether capitalist or
Marxist or with mixed economies, are devoted to continual economic
growth. As Professor Bernard Crick has said, "Most of his [Machiavel-
li's] arguments in terms of military technology are now directly trans-
latable in terms of economic technology. Even when we stay in the
same place, we have to run pretty fast to do it."3' 3 All governments
claim the ability not only to maintain but to raise the scale of living, or
at least the total economic product (the gross national product) of their
inhabitants. Whether they can do it is at best an unanswered question;
at worst, it is highly unlikely. But try governments will, as try they
must, if political officers wish to remain in power.
This essay, in sum, is a preliminary foray both into posing some of
the correct questions about the human condition, without which correct
answers will never be forthcoming, and suggesting some possible an-
swers. In fine, I seek to establish a framework for thinking about major
constitutional change-planned change, that is, not the change that
comes about routinely as each generation of Americans rewrites the
Document of 1787. Mine is a radical approach-nothing less than a
complete overhaul of ancient ideas of how to govern the United States.
Not that the past wisdom, if that it is, can or will be discarded. Adher-
32. Machiavelli, supra note 21, at 1.6.
33. Id. at 53.
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ence to it, however, is neither a duty nor a necessity. We cannot escape
the past but what the constitutional framers said is not revealed truth,
not like Moses coming down from Mt. Sinai; but merely as one datum
among a number of others that must be considered in evaluating Amer-
ican constitutionalism.
Those who wrote the Constitution of 1787 could not have failed.
Everything favored the success of the new nation: an untapped conti-
nent replete with seemingly inexhaustible natural resources, protected
by two oceans and the British navy, was given the unique opportunity
to create something new and lasting. That very success, however,
should be traced to the favorable environment in which American polit-
ical institutions operated, rather than to any sort of special wisdom in
the constitutional framers or in what they wrought. The United States
has waxed large and strong not because of the Constitution but in spite
of it. Or, as Rufus E. Miles, Jr., put it, "[t]he extraordinary affluence
of the United States has been produced by a set of fortuitous, nonrepli-
cable, and nonsustainable factors. ' 34 We now confront a totally differ-
ent social milieu, and the Constitution must be changed to deal with it.
What, then, are the constitutional changes that should be given
serious attention? Time and space permit only a listing of some of the
more obvious.
1. Altering the separation of powers in the national government to
adopt a parliamentary system, based upon but not necessarily a direct
copy of the British system.
2. This would require a new way of electing the president. The
electoral college should be abolished. The president would truly be
head of party, subject to removal on a vote of confidence.
3. Furthermore, the presidency should be divided into one person
being head of government (like a prime minister) and another being
chief of state (like the King of Spain or Queen of England). It is worth
special mention that the United States is the only important nation in
the world that allows one person to wear both of those hats.
4. Congress should be unicameral, with not more than one hun-
dred members.
5. The fifty states should be consolidated into not more than ten or
twelve geographically contiguous regions.
6. The "private" governing power of important social groups, such
as the giant corporations and the two major political parties, should be
34. R. MILES, AWAKENING FROM THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE SOCIAL AND PO-
LITICAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 224 (1976).
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recognized and made a part of the formal constitutional structure.
7. Provisions should be made for cooperation in a constitutional
sense of the fact that the United States exists in an interdependent
world-a "global village"-and has many and growing relationships
with other nations.
8. The idea of a "council of revision," considered in the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787 but rejected, should be resurrected and made
into a "council of state" that would be advisory to the president and
Congress before important decisions are made.3"
9. A "planning" function should be incorporated into the duties of
government.
10. Means should be established for controlling technology, includ-
ing nuclear weapons.
Time and space do not permit more than listing these possible-in
my judgment, necessary-changes in the constitutional mechanism. 6
The fundamental idea is that the Constitution of the United States
should be one of human needs and human rights, as well as one that
sets forth the powers of government. In short, I propose a Constitution
that, by making responsible government possible through streamlining
and updating the present obsolescent mechanism, will enable the
United States to meet the challenges of a zero-sum society. The four
hundred-year boom has ended. The Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm, re-
flected in the writings of the "father" of the American Constitution,
John Locke, is outdated. It is being replaced, all too slowly, by a new
vision of reality: "an awareness of the essential interrelatedness and
interdependence of all phenomena-physical, biological, psychological,
social, and cultural. ' 7 As Americans approach the 200th anniversary
of the constitutional convention of 1787, there is no more important
question confronting them than modernizing the ancient document, so
as to adapt it to the new reality.
35. See A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982).
36. The details and reasons for these, and other changes, will be set forth in the
author's proposed book, supra note *.
37. Capra, supra note 12, at 265.
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